Friday, November 21, 2025

The Instagram Groomer Scandal That Nobody Cared About


 The Instagram Groomer Scandal That Nobody Cared About

How a 2019 internal Meta document exposed catastrophic child-safety failures, resurfaced in a 2025 antitrust trial, and then vanished from public outrageIn May 2025, during the closing weeks of the Federal Trade Commission’s long-running monopolization lawsuit against Meta Platforms, government lawyers introduced a document that should have detonated across every news cycle in America.The document was a June 2019 internal Meta presentation titled “Inappropriate Interactions with Children on Instagram.” Among its findings:
  • Instagram’s recommendation engine was suggesting that accounts Meta itself had flagged as “groomers” (i.e., adults exhibiting predatory behavior toward children) follow minor users.
  • Fully 27% of the accounts recommended to these groomer profiles belonged to children.
  • Over a single three-month period in 2019, more than two million minor-held accounts were pushed to predatory adults by Instagram’s own algorithms.
For context, the baseline rate at which Instagram recommended minors to ordinary adult users was 7%. Groomers were being served child accounts at almost four times the normal rate.This was not a leak from an outside researcher or a whistle-blower. This was Meta’s own safety and integrity team reporting the numbers to senior executives — including, presumably, Mark Zuckerberg — six full years before the document saw daylight in court.Yet the revelation barely registered. A handful of technology and legal outlets (Bloomberg, The Verge, TechCrunch, The Washington Post) ran straightforward accounts. Cable news ignored it almost entirely. There were no emergency congressional hearings, no viral parent outrage on TikTok, no advertiser boycott. Even accounts that normally amplify QAnon-style “elite pedophile ring” narratives stayed strangely quiet.Two weeks later, on May 20, 2025, U.S. District Judge James E. Boasberg ruled comprehensively in Meta’s favor and dismissed the FTC’s case. The groomer document was mentioned only in passing in his 97-page opinion, and then only to note that child-safety issues were outside the scope of an antitrust lawsuit.The scandal that should have ended careers evaporated in plain sight. How did we get here?1. The 2019 numbers in detailThe internal slides (first reported by Bloomberg and later corroborated by court filings) are stomach-churning when you read the raw data:
  • Meta’s systems had already identified thousands of accounts as “groomers” based on behavioral signals (repeatedly attempting to contact minors, being mass-blocked or reported by teens, etc.).
  • When these groomer accounts opened Instagram, the “People You May Know” and follow-suggestion surfaces fed them child accounts at a wildly disproportionate rate.
  • 2,043,816 unique minor accounts were recommended to groomers in just 90 days.
  • 500,000+ minors received follow requests from accounts that Meta’s own safety classifiers believed were predatory.
To be clear: Meta knew in real time that its core growth engine — the same recommendation algorithm that decides which accounts you see and which see you — was functioning as a predator-discovery tool. The company’s eventual fixes (restricting teen accounts to private-by-default in September 2024, rolling out “suspicious adult” blocks in 2021–2023, and adding parental consent requirements for under-16 setting changes) came years after the scale of the problem was documented internally.2. Why the 2025 courtroom moment fell flatThe FTC introduced the groomer document not because the antitrust trial was suddenly about child safety — it wasn’t — but to bolster a narrower argument: that Meta systematically under-invested in Instagram’s safety and integrity teams after acquiring the app in 2012, choosing instead to starve resources and prioritize growth and ad revenue.Testimony from Instagram co-founder Kevin Systrom, former integrity VP Guy Rosen, and internal emails painted a consistent picture:
  • Instagram’s child-safety and anti-abuse teams were kept deliberately small.
  • In 2018–2019, Rosen repeatedly warned Zuckerberg that Instagram was “behind” Facebook on integrity issues and needed aggressive investment.
  • Zuckerberg’s response, according to Rosen’s contemporaneous emails, was that Instagram had “another year or two” before it needed to catch up, and that resource allocation was “deliberate.”
The FTC’s theory: by refusing to fund adequate safety infrastructure, Meta preserved its monopoly — competitors who might have invested more heavily in trust and safety never got the oxygen to challenge Instagram’s dominance.Judge Boasberg was visibly uninterested. When FTC lawyers lingered on the groomer statistics, he interrupted: “Let’s move along.” In his final opinion he wrote that however “disturbing” the 2019 findings were, they were “years-old” and irrelevant to whether Meta possesses monopoly power in 2025.3. The broader collapse of public outrageSeveral converging factors explain why one of the worst corporate child-endangerment scandals in American history produced almost no sustained fury:a) Scandal fatigue and the Epstein paradox
By 2025 the American public had lived through Cambridge Analytica, Christchurch live-streaming, Myanmar genocide facilitation, Teen Vogue mental-health contagion stories, and endless whistle-blower dumps. Another document showing that a tech platform harmed children felt like old news. Paradoxically, the Epstein files and elite child-trafficking conspiracies had so thoroughly colonized the discourse that a concrete, documented, mass-scale failure by a household-name company seemed… mundane.
b) The TikTok distraction
Meta successfully reframed the entire antitrust case around short-form video competition. Once Judge Boasberg accepted that Instagram Reels and TikTok are “reasonably interchangeable” in the eyes of users and advertisers, the 2019 groomer algorithm became ancient history — something that happened in a different market, on a different app, in a different era.
c) Political realignment
The trial ended just as the second Trump administration was taking shape. Trump’s highly public dinner with Zuckerberg in September 2025 and his simultaneous push to preempt all state-level AI regulation (a massive favor to Meta, OpenAI, Google, and the rest of Big Tech) shifted elite attention away from historical sins and toward future deregulatory bonanzas.
d) Judicial normalization of harm
Boasberg’s opinion contains a remarkable passage defending algorithmic video feeds over traditional social networking:
“They can sift through millions of videos and find the perfect one for her — and it is more likely to interest her than a humdrum update from a friend she knew in high school.”
In a single sentence the court ratified the transformation of Instagram from a tool for human connection into a slot machine — and declared the trade-off not merely acceptable but superior.4. The real story the trial accidentally toldThe FTC lost on the law, but the evidence it put into the public record is devastating:
  • Meta documented, in 2019, that its recommendation engine was a predator-facilitation tool at industrial scale.
  • Senior executives, including the CEO, were informed.
  • The company consciously decided that fixing the problem was less urgent than continued hyper-growth.
  • Six years later the primary “fix” remains opt-in teen accounts that still allow 16- and 17-year-olds to switch themselves to public with no oversight.
Meanwhile, Instagram continues to be the app where the overwhelming majority of in-person child sexual abuse material (CSAM) grooming begins, according to law-enforcement agencies and the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). A 2024 NCMEC report found that 78% of minor victims who were groomed online leading to offline contact were first approached on Instagram — far ahead of Snapchat (12%) or any other platform.5. Where we are now (November 2025)Meta’s stock is near all-time highs. Instagram Reels ad revenue is growing 40%+ year-over-year. Teen daily active usage is at record levels. The company is aggressively integrating generative AI tools (Imagine, AI Studio, Llama-powered chatbots) that will make discovering and contacting strangers — including minors — even easier.Legislative efforts to impose genuine age verification, default private teen accounts with mandatory parental opt-in, or liability for algorithmic amplification of CSAM have all stalled. The most recent serious proposal — the Kids Off Social Media Act (S.3314) — died in committee in September 2025 after intense lobbying from Meta, Snap, and TikTok.And the 2019 groomer document? It is now just another unsealed exhibit in a dismissed case, gathering dust in the PACER database.The quiet burial of what should have been an era-defining scandal is, in its own way, the perfect epitaph for the Big Tech antitrust era that began with such hope in 2020 and ended, five years later, with a shrug.We learned everything we needed to know about how these platforms actually work — and then collectively decided we no longer had the political or cultural energy to do anything about it.

Monday, November 10, 2025

The Escrow Tsunami... Can Blue States Bankrupt the Federal Leviathan?



The Escrow Tsunami: Can Blue States Bankrupt the Federal Leviathan?

The ultimate act of state defiance is no longer just symbolic. Facing a hostile and aggressively weaponized federal apparatus, powerful Democratic-led states are weighing a radical, potentially catastrophic, strategy: redirecting hundreds of billions of federal tax dollars into state-controlled escrow accounts. The precedent isn't a constitutional challenge—it's the successful, coordinated breakdown of federal drug law enforcement. The stakes are no less than the survival of the American constitutional order.

By A. Piratemonk 

In 2010, at the height of the Tea Party wave, Washington State House Republicans introduced a quixotic bill—HB 2712, the “Washington state sovereignty and federal tax escrow account act of 2010.” It proposed a mechanism that was, at the time, dismissed as both legally preposterous and politically performative: require employers to remit federal payroll withholdings to a state escrow account instead of the IRS. A legislative panel would then review federal spending for constitutional compliance, releasing only the portions deemed acceptable. The rest would stay in Washington.

The bill, sponsored by Republicans during a Democratic trifecta and the Obama administration, died a quiet death in committee. Critics cited the Supremacy Clause and the venerable 1819 ruling in


McCulloch v. Maryland
, which established that states cannot obstruct federal functions, including taxation. It was a fringe idea, a gesture of nullification-lite.

But the political and constitutional landscape of 2025 is fundamentally unrecognizable from 2010. The concerns once confined to the furthest reaches of the anti-federal right have been adopted, amplified, and given new, existential urgency by the nation's political left.

Today, Democratic-led states—the economic powerhouses of the union—face a federal executive they view not as an occasional adversary, but as a systematic violator of civil liberties and constitutional law, operating, ironically, with money supplied by the very states it is actively targeting. The question is no longer whether Washington State Republicans can get traction for a symbolic bill, but whether California, New York, Illinois, and their blue allies can, through coordinated economic leverage, effectively veto the operations of the federal government itself.


The Constitutional Catastrophe Funded by Blue Money

The current crisis, as blue state leaders see it, is a self-financing occupation. California, the economic engine of the nation, remits over $400 billion annually in federal taxes. New York contributes hundreds of billions more. This revenue is being channeled back into a federal apparatus that, according to blue state governors and attorneys general, is engaged in a series of systematic constitutional abuses within their borders:

  • Weaponized Enforcement: Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents conduct targeted enforcement actions in cities like Los Angeles, often over the explicit objections of state and local officials who have declared themselves "sanctuary" jurisdictions (Congressional Research Service, 2025). This is a direct confrontation with state sovereignty.

  • Targeting Political Opposition: Department of Justice (DOJ) resources are allegedly being weaponized for prosecutions targeting political opponents, including Democratic officials, a flagrant breach of anti-corruption norms and a profound threat to democratic stability.

  • Ignoring Judicial Orders: Federal enforcement actions, particularly by ICE, have been documented as violating active judicial injunctions and consent decrees. A federal judge in Northern California, for instance, has had to extend a consent decree specifically prohibiting ICE from conducting arrests without warrants or probable cause in the region (National Immigrant Justice Center, 2025). The administration appears to ignore court orders it disagrees with, treating the judiciary as a purely advisory body.

  • Commandeering and Occupation: The deployment of federal agents or even National Guard units—funded by federal appropriations derived largely from blue states—into cities like Chicago or Portland, despite the explicit refusal of state governors to cooperate, runs afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine established by the Supreme Court in cases like New York v. United States and Printz v. United States. These rulings confirm the Tenth Amendment prevents the federal government from forcing state executives to enforce federal law.

The core argument of the blue state resistance is simple and devastatingly direct: Why should we finance the apparatus that occupies our territory, corruptly prosecutes our officials, and violates the constitutional rights of our residents?


The Escrow Mechanism: A Veto Through Withholding

The mechanism to halt this self-financed assault is the Tax Escrow Act, a radical revival of the 2010 Washington bill.

State legislatures would pass laws ordering every employer in the state to redirect all federal tax withholdings—income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes—to a state-controlled escrow account instead of the IRS. The money—hundreds of billions each month from coordinated blue states—would sit in state treasuries.

The funds would not be refused; they would be held conditionally. If the federal government wants access to the revenue, it must submit to an independent, state-mandated audit. The inspection criteria would require verification of:

  1. Constitutional Compliance: Prove operations respect due process, uphold the anti-commandeering doctrine, and comply with existing court orders.

  2. Appropriations Compliance: Demonstrate that funds are allocated according to Congressional appropriations, not redirected via executive actions or used for unconstitutional purposes.

  3. Anti-Corruption Compliance: Verify that the tax dollars are not funding corruption, such as pay-for-pardon schemes or violations of the Emoluments Clause.

If the administration passes the audit, the billions are released. If it fails, or refuses to submit, the money stays in escrow, accruing interest for the benefit of the state’s taxpayers.

This is not a simple refusal to pay taxes—which would be a clear violation of the Constitution under McCulloch—but an attempt to establish accountability and conditional funding for an executive branch that, in the view of the states, is already operating above constitutional limits. It’s a mechanism to force compliance with the fundamental rule of law, using the power of the purse as the ultimate check.


Nullification's New Face: Enforcement Capacity Over Legal Theory

The primary objection remains legal: isn't this blatant nullification, and hasn't the Supreme Court always rejected nullification?

The proponents of the Escrow Tsunami argue that legal arguments about constitutionality don’t determine whether this strategy works. Enforcement capacity does.

This position is rooted in the practical successes of state-level resistance, or what is often termed “de facto nullification”—where a state or coalition of states simply refuses to enforce a federal law, rendering it politically and operationally unfeasible.

🌿 Case Study 1: Cannabis Legalization

The most visible and successful example is cannabis legalization. The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) explicitly classifies marijuana as a Schedule I substance, making its cultivation, sale, and possession illegal nationwide. Federal courts did not grant permission for state-level legalization; states like Colorado and Washington simply proceeded, in direct violation of federal law.

The federal government’s enforcement agencies—the FBI, DEA, and U.S. Attorneys' offices—lacked the resources and the political will to arrest millions of state residents, shut down thousands of state-licensed businesses, and prosecute state officials across a growing number of states.

  • In 2008, there were approximately 68,000 federal law enforcement officers with arrest authority across all agencies (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012). The number of state and local law enforcement officers was over 1.1 million (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). The sheer disparity in manpower made independent federal enforcement against a coordinated state populace impossible.

  • Federal drug prosecutions are overwhelmingly focused on large-scale trafficking and opioids like heroin and fentanyl (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2022). State-level decriminalization effectively starved the federal drug war of the local and state cooperation necessary for widespread enforcement of marijuana laws. The political cost of federal mass arrests in legalization states became prohibitive.

The lesson is clear: when enough states choose not to participate in the enforcement of a federal law—or, in this case, choose to undermine the federal government's funding—the federal government lacks the capacity to enforce independently.

🆔 Case Study 2: REAL ID

A less dramatic but equally illustrative example is the REAL ID Act of 2005. The law mandated that states create federally compliant driver’s licenses by a certain deadline. Citing concerns about federal overreach and privacy, twenty-five states passed legislation explicitly opposing the mandate (Wikipedia, 2025).

The federal government, unable to coerce state compliance, was forced into a nineteen-year cycle of delay and appeasement: the mandatory enforcement deadline was extended in 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2020, 2021, 2022, and most recently to May 7, 2025 (Department of Homeland Security, 2020, 2025). The states’ coordinated refusal rendered the federal mandate toothless.


The Calculation of Coordinated Resistance

The Tax Escrow Act is an act of economic warfare, and its success hinges on coordination and scale.

A single state, such as Oregon, could be isolated, sued by the DOJ, and have its escrow account seized. Its state officials could be criminally prosecuted. The federal government’s enforcement mechanisms—the courts and federal police power—would make quick work of a lone resister.

However, the current political landscape offers the blue states the necessary scale:

  • Political Infrastructure: The Governors Safeguarding Democracy initiative, founded in November 2024 by Illinois Governor JB Pritzker and Colorado Governor Jared Polis, has already established the infrastructure for coordinated state resistance, including tabletop exercises on funding cuts and legal frameworks (Colorado Governor’s Office, 2024).

  • Political Control: Fifteen states are under Democratic trifecta control (Governor, State House, and State Senate) (Ballotpedia, n.d.). Twenty-two states plus the District of Columbia have Democratic Attorneys General (Ballotpedia, n.d.), providing a coordinated legal defense against DOJ challenges.

  • Economic Leverage: These Democratic-controlled states represent the bulk of the nation's economic power and, critically, a disproportionately large share of federal tax revenue—they are net contributor states.

    • California alone represents approximately 14.5% of national GDP.

    • New York adds another 8%.

    • Illinois, Massachusetts, and Washington collectively contribute trillions more.

A coordinated escrow action by the 15 Democratic trifecta states would instantaneously choke off the flow of hundreds of billions of dollars to Washington D.C. The federal government cannot simultaneously:

  1. Maintain the national tax collection system (IRS).

  2. Arrest state tax commissioners and state treasurers across 15 jurisdictions.

  3. Seize state treasury accounts by force.

  4. Withhold federal funding from states that are net contributors—that send far more to Washington than they receive back in allocations.

The enforcement mechanisms simply do not exist to counter this scale of financial resistance. The operational reality—the capacity to enforce the law—supersedes the constitutional objection. 


The Moral Calculus of Collapse

Opponents of the escrow strategy raise a critical moral and practical concern: wouldn't this accelerate the institutional breakdown and damage the very populations blue states aim to protect? A collapse of federal funding would stop Social Security payments, military salaries, Medicare disbursements, and federal research grants.

The advocates of tax escrow, however, counter with a chilling premise: The institutions have already collapsed.

They argue that the "norms" the nation relies on—that presidents will peacefully transfer power, that the executive will respect judicial orders, that public service is not for personal financial gain—are no longer governing constraints.

"Norms aren't legislation that remains enforceable after violation. They’re behavioral expectations that cease to constrain the moment enough powerful actors demonstrate willingness to ignore consequences."

When a president can allegedly lead a violent attempt to overturn an election, face no accountability for years, and then win the presidency again under questionable circumstances, the social contract is broken. The argument that one can vote their way back to a world where the other side follows the rules is deemed a profound misreading of the current political reality.

For blue state leaders, the choice is between:

  1. Continuing to finance a systematically weaponized federal government that operates against their residents and principles, while pretending institutions still function.

  2. Building an alternative accountability mechanism—the escrow account—that creates consequences for executive lawlessness where none currently exist.

The former leads to the slow, systematic destruction of constitutional authorities using blue state money. The latter forces a confrontation, leading to one of two superior outcomes:

  • Compliance: The administration complies with constitutional requirements to access the hundreds of billions in revenue.

  • Decentralization: Blue states retain the revenue, stop financing hostile federal operations, and begin the work of building independent systems, an outcome dubbed "soft secession."

The stakes are existential, and the time for incrementalism has passed. Blue state legislatures are being urged to pass tax escrow legislation within 90 days—to leverage their economic power before the hostile regime can consolidate power further.


Other Fronts in the Resistance

The tax escrow is just one piece of a broader, multi-pronged strategy being developed by the Governors Safeguarding Democracy and like-minded state leaders. Other fronts include:

  • Interstate Compacts: Coordinating multi-state legal and policy resistance, for example, on environmental standards or reproductive rights, that act as a cohesive counter-force to federal deregulation.

  • Public Banking: Eliminating the reliance on Wall Street financial institutions to control state finances, thereby reducing the federal government’s leverage over state credit and stability.

  • Criminal Prosecutions: Using state-level criminal or civil charges to hold federal officials accountable for actions that violate state law or state constitutional rights when the DOJ refuses to act. A prime example is a federal judge permanently blocking the deployment of the National Guard to Portland (Oregon Public Broadcasting, 2025), but state attorneys general are developing frameworks for proactive prosecution.

The ultimate confrontation is no longer ideological; it’s an existential test of power. The blue states, representing the economic and, increasingly, the political counter-weight of the nation, are preparing to use their most powerful tool—the national treasury—to force the federal government back within the constitutional boundaries it has, in their view, aggressively discarded. The question is whether the constitutional order can be saved through an act of deliberate economic chaos. The answer is unfolding in the state houses of Sacramento, Albany, and Springfield.

Friday, November 7, 2025

The Longhouse Before the Hall: How the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (Iroquois) Modeled Governance Far Beyond Europe

The Longhouse Before the Hall: How the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (Iroquois) Modeled Governance Far Beyond Europe 

By A. Piratemonk

In the pre-colonial wetlands, forests and lakes of what is now upstate New York and Ontario, the Haudenosaunee — commonly known historically as the Iroquois — built a society of surprising durability and innovation. Their constitution, the Great Law of Peace (Kaianere’kó:wa), knit together six nations (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and later Tuscarora) into a confederation based on consensus, shared councils and Indigenous law. According to tradition, this system dates back centuries — some place its origins in the 12th century, others in the 15th or 16th. Wikipedia+1

Yet the remarkable thing is this: while the European idea of stable, participatory governance was still nascent (and often agonizingly fragile), the Haudenosaunee system endured for generations. And in the late 18th century American founders, facing the collapse of the Articles of Confederation and virtually no modern European model of federal democratic governance to borrow, encountered this living example of multilevel governance and drew inspiration from it. In short, the “weak democracy” of fragmented European polities stands in stark contrast to the indigenous structure that not only lasted but thrived.

Below I trace three strands: first, the architecture of the Great Law of Peace; second, how the American founders encountered it and incorporated its ideas; and third, how European (and early American) democracies proved far more brittle — and what we may learn from the longevity of Indigenous governance.


1. The architecture of the Great Law of Peace

Origins and structure

The Haudenosaunee narrative holds that the Peacemaker and Hiawatha traveled among warring nations to promulgate the Great Law of Peace, uniting separate tribes into a longhouse-metaphor polity. PBS+1 Each nation retained self-governance for internal matters, yet together they formed a Grand Council of chiefs (sachems) representing each clan. Montana Office of Public Instruction

Important features of the Great Law include:

  • A confederated body: the six nations maintain independence in many local affairs but unite on common matters. HISTORY+1

  • Consensus and deliberation: Many decisions required the agreement of chiefs and clan mothers, consensus-style deliberation rather than mere majorities. Wikipedia+1

  • Checks on power: The Great Law required chiefs to act for the people, to be recalled if they failed duties. The authority of clan mothers in selecting or removing chiefs, and the role of the people in council, provided balance. Digital Commons

  • Recognition of individual and collective rights: While the Haudenosaunee system is not identical to modern liberal democracy, texts assert that it included protections of speech, religion and freedom within the community. Molly Larkin+1

  • Stability of governance: The confederacy managed to survive internal rivalries, pressures from colonial powers, wars and disease. The structure itself proved resilient across centuries.

Because of these features, some have argued the Great Law of Peace may represent one of the earliest long-lasting federal democratic models in the Western hemisphere. HarvardKey+1

Longevity compared with European precedents

When we look across Europe in the early modern period, many states were autocracies, principalities, fragmented polities, or weak federations. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, democracies were often caught between legislatures that ruled too much and the people who pulled back too far. Project Gutenberg Political structures in Europe often lacked mechanisms for enduring consensual governance across multiple polities. Confederal unions—like the Germanic Confederation or the Low Countries—persisted but were brittle, vulnerable to domination or collapse. Reading Rooms+1

By contrast, the Haudenosaunee confederacy had persisted for hundreds of years before European contact and retained functionality even through the upheavals of colonization and treaty pressures.


2. Encounter and influence: The Founders meet the Longhouse

Early contact and models

In the decades before the U.S. constitutional convention, colonial delegates began to observe and comment on Indigenous nations. According to the Library of Congress blog:

“The original framers of the Constitution … are known to have greatly admired the concepts, principles and governmental practices of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy.” The Library of Congress

For example:

  • At the 1754 Albany Congress (where Benjamin Franklin proposed the Albany Plan for a union of the colonies), the Iroquois model of inter-tribal union was explicitly referenced. Native America Today

  • Franklin published speeches by Iroquois leaders and mused about colonial unity through Iroquois-style alliance. Independence Institute

Constitutional echoes

While the idea that the U.S. Constitution is a direct copy of the Great Law of Peace is debated, many scholars accept that the Haudenosaunee system offered a living example of federalism, distributed authority and coalition governance — which the Founders lacked in purely European models. As History.com puts it:

“When the delegates … were deciding what form of government the United States should have, there were no contemporary democracies in Europe from which they could draw inspiration.” HISTORY

Some specific similarities often cited:

  • A two-chamber structure (or at least dual-representation of states and peoples) in U.S. federal design, which finds rough analogue in nations and clans combining in a Grand Council. PBS+1

  • Checks and balances: The Confederal structure required different nations and councils, limiting unilateral power — a lesson absent in many European polities of the time.

  • Federalism: The U.S. Constitution’s division of state and national powers echoes the principle of distinct authority for each member nation plus unified diplomacy/defence in the confederacy. HISTORY

In 1988, the U.S. Congress passed a concurrent resolution acknowledging the influence of the Iroquois Confederacy on the U.S. Constitution. Native America Today+1

What was left out — and why

However, the translation of Indigenous governance into the U.S. frame was imperfect and selective. For instance:

  • The Haudenosaunee system gave significant political power to clan mothers (women) in selecting/removing chiefs; the U.S. Constitution excluded women and non-white persons from the initial franchise. Digital Commons+1

  • The Iroquois model relied on consensus in many cases rather than simple majority rule, and community duties were grounded in clan relations rather than abstract individual liberal rights. Wikipedia

  • Some historians argue that the evidence of direct textual borrowing is weak. One article terms the connection “tenuous.” Spokesman-Review+1

Thus, while the Iroquois system did not replicate line-for-line into the U.S. Constitution, it offered conceptual precedents at a moment when the Founders were scrambling for models.


3. Why the Longhouse Outlasted the Castle: Lessons in durability

When we compare the Haudenosaunee confederacy with early European democratic/confederal systems (and even the early U.S. union under the Articles of Confederation), certain contrasts stand out.

Europe’s “weak democracy” problem

  • European polities in the 17th-18th centuries generally lacked stable federal models. Confederations—such as the Dutch Republic, the Germanic states or the Swiss cantons—were vulnerable to domination, foreign war, internal fragmentation. As de Tocqueville warns: “In all former confederations the privileges of the Union furnished more elements of discord than of power.” Project Gutenberg

  • Disunited sovereignties, weak central authority, overlapping jurisdictions and absence of shared civic identity impeded endurance. WueCampus

  • The early U.S. under the Articles (1781-89) nearly collapsed under the weight of its own weak union and poor institutional design.

Haudenosaunee resilience

By contrast:

  • The Great Law’s longevity rests partly on its adaptability: each nation retained local autonomy, while the Grand Council governed shared matters — striking a balance between local independence and common good.

  • The structure of clan and nation created social embedment: clan mothers and chiefs were accountable to their people, the system was deeply embedded in social relations and custom, not simply a written charter.

  • The governance framework was lived, not only theoretical: the Longhouse model enabled functioning union across multiple groups, with consensus-based decision making and mechanisms for conflict resolution.

  • Furthermore, although the Haudenosaunee faced enormous pressures — European colonization, displacement, disease, war — the governance model nonetheless preserved identity, law, and political structure for centuries before the late 18th century colonial upheavals.

What this suggests for modern democracies

  • Enduring governance may depend less on the written form of a constitution (though that matters) and more on the social embedment of its institutions: authority that is accountable, embedded in custom and tied to legitimacy of the people.

  • Federal structures that allow constituent units autonomy but also a shared “common roof” may have greater durability than top-down central models. The U.S. founders, in drawing from the Iroquois example, implicitly sought such balance.

  • Democracies flourish when power is not overly concentrated and when decision-making bodies allow deliberation and representation — modes seen in the Grand Council and clan-mother intervention.


Epilogue: Un-Learning the “Weak Democracy” Narrative

The story of the Haudenosaunee and the Great Law of Peace challenges dominant narratives in Western political historiography. Many histories focus on Greece, Rome, the Enlightenment and incremental European evolutions toward liberal democracy. Yet here was a non-European polity that sustained a participatory, federal governance structure for centuries. When the American colonies needed a model of union, they looked to it.

Thus: rather than seeing European democracies as the only antecedents of modern constitutionalism, we should recognise that the line of democratic governance may run through the longhouse as much as the parlement. And rather than expecting durability from mere majoritarian rule, this story suggests durability arises from embedded custom, shared responsibility and deliberate design of institutional relations.

In our current era—where many democracies struggle under polarization, weakened institutions and centralization—the Haudenosaunee example offers a provocative mirror: how might we rebuild democratic systems that are both resilient and rooted in local agency, consensus and accountability?